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Abstract.Decision theory and folk psychology both purport to represent the same phe-
nomena: our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states. They also purport to do
the same work with these representations: explain and predict our actions. But they do
so with different sets of concepts. There’s much at stake in whether one of these two
sets of concepts can be accounted for with the other. Without such an account, we’d
have two competing representations and systems of prediction and explanation, a du-
bious dualism. Many would be tempted to reject one of the two pictures, yet neither
can be let go lightly. Folk psychology structures our daily lives and has proven fruitful
in the study of mind and ethics, while decision theory is pervasive in various disciplines,
including the quantitative social sciences, neuroscience, and philosophy. My interest
is in accounting for folk psychology with decision theory—in particular, for believing
and wanting, which decision theory omits. Many have attempted this task for belief.
(The Lockean Thesis says that there is such an account.) I take up the parallel task for
wanting, which has received far less attention. I propose, in the terms of decision the-
ory, necessary and sufficient conditions for when you’re truly said to want. I give an
analogue of the Lockean Thesis for wanting. My account is an alternative to orthodox
accounts that link wanting to preference (e.g. Stalnaker (1984), Lewis (1986)), which
I argue are false. I also further that want ascriptions are context-sensitive. My account
explains this context-sensitivity, makes sense of conflicting desires, and accommodates
phenomena that motivate traditional theses on which ‘want’ has multiple senses (e.g.
all-things-considered vs. pro tanto).
1 Introduction
Folk psychology and descriptive decision theory both purport to represent the
same phenomena: our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states. They also
purport to do the same work with these representations: explain and predict our
actions. That is, both descriptive decision theory and folk psychology aim to show
how our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states make sense of how we
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act. You might expect, then, that the concepts of decision theory and those of folk
psychology could be accounted for in terms of the other. Can they be?
There is a lot at stake in this question. If its answer were no, then we would
be left with a dubious dualism: two competing representations of the same phe-
nomena, two competing systems of prediction and explanation of the same actions.
This dualism would tempt many to reject one of the two pictures, yet neither can
be let go lightly. Folk psychology structures our daily lives: we understand each
other in large part on the basis of notions of folk psychology, such as believing and
wanting. These notions have also been fruitful in both the philosophy of mind
(e.g. Davidson (1963), Dretske (1988)) and ethics (e.g. Smith (1994)). Decision theory
is similarly significant. It holds a pride of place in the quantitative social sciences,
especially economics, and is widely used in other disciplines, too, like neuroscience
and philosophy.
In this paper, I investigate whether we can account for folk psychology with
decision theory. There are two cornerstone notions of folk psychology—believing
and wanting—that stand in special need of accounting, for they are omitted by
decision theory, which works instead with credence (or degrees of confidence) and
preference.
Many have attempted this accounting task for belief, offering necessary and suf-
ficient conditions, stated in terms of credence, for when you’re truly said to believe
(e.g. Foley (1992), Sturgeon (2008), Easwaran (2016), Leitgeb (2017)).1 (The Lockean
Thesis says that there are such conditions.) The same task for wanting has garnered
much less attention. It is my task. I give necessary and sufficient conditions, stated
in terms of decision theory, for when you’re truly said to want;2 I give an analogue
of the Lockean Thesis for wanting.
2 The decision-theoretic concept for an account of wanting: expected value
Before considering particular decision-theoretic accounts of wanting, we need to
identify the decision-theoretic concepts that we’ll use in formulating the accounts.
Decision theory’s basic concepts are the credence function, discussed above, and
1Others argue against these conditions: for example, Ganson (2008), Buchak (2014), Staffel (2016).
2There are other things to do, like addressing, as Dreier (2005) has done, Pettit’s (1991; 2002) objec-
tions that (i) decision theory (putatively) doesn’t have the right desiderative structure to account for
wanting, and (ii) desire (putatively) can take either prospects or properties as objects (see also (Jackson,
1985)), while decision theory countenances only prospects. Also important is to determine whether
desire- and preference-like states are fundamentally one-place (like wanting) or two-place (like preference)
(Pollock, 2006).
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the value function, which assigns a real number to each outcome.3 The particular
values the value function assigns are in and of themselves immaterial; what matters
is the relationship between the values.4 When you prefer one outcome to another,
your value function assigns a higher number to the first. When you prefer one
outcome much more than another, or just a little bit more than another, that’s rep-
resented by the relative distance between the values assigned to those two outcomes.
The greater the preference, the bigger the distance.
The credence function alone is of course not what we’re looking for—building
an account of wanting entirely out of a belief-like notion would be like squeezing
blood from a stone. We need a decision-theoretic concept that includes the value
function, and decision theory affords us many concepts that do. The one that
I’ll use is expected value, and I’ll use it because of the work that it’s done in the
theories of others (and the work it does throughout this paper). Expected value, a
hybrid of the value function and credence function, is the most commonly used
decision-theoretic notion for predicting and explaining action—across a variety of
disciplines (Erickson et al., 2013). It’s proven fruitful to account for wanting, too.
Indeed, expected value has been the concept of choice for all those who’ve ventured
to understand wanting with decision theory.
To get a feel for how wanting and expected value align, consider just one of
various things that expected value does: it paints a neat picture of how we want
certain things because we believe (or expect) they’ll lead to other things that we
want or value. Two people who at the end of the day value the same things may
differ in what they want because they may differ in what they expect to happen.
Imagine that O’Neal will give his next paycheck to fight malaria and you and I
are debating which organization he should donate to. When all is said and done,
you and I value one and the same thing: how many lives are saved. Suppose that
O’Neal may donate to the Nets Foundation. I think it’s highly likely that the Nets
Foundation is effective; you’re sure it’s a scam. I want O’Neal to donate to the Nets
Foundation; you don’t.
Because I’m confident that the Nets Foundation is effective, I expect that a do-
nation will likely result in something we both value—many lives being saved—and
so I assign a high expected value to the donation. You, though, are sure that the
Nets Foundation is a scam, so you expect that saved lives won’t result from a do-
3Just what outcomes are isn’t important for my purposes.
4Exactly which value function we pick is itself also immaterial. Any function that preserves the
relative distances between the values will do.
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nation. You assign a low expected value to the donation. I want O’Neal to donate
and I assign a high expected value to him donating. You don’t want O’Neal to do-
nate and you don’t assign a high expected value to him donating. This divergence
of expected value is no coincidence. You and I diverge in what we want because we
diverge in how we expect things to go if O’Neal donates.
Ultimately, expected value may not be quite right for an account of wanting. It
has been criticized for its ability to carry out the task of descriptive decision theory:
to represent non-ideally rational agents like you and me. Responses have been
given, and responses to the responses, and responses to. . . 5 The decision-theoretic
concept for a proper account of wanting will be some entity like expected value—
perhaps expected value itself—that emerges from this debate. To keep things simple,
I’ll work with expected value.
3 Against What’s-best Accounts
We’ve chosen a decision-theoretic concept for our account of wanting—expected
value. The rest of this paper is about finding the right expected value-based ac-
count.
In this section I criticize what I call What’s-best Accounts, accounts that say
that you want what’s best in your eyes among a given set of alternatives. The
idea that you want what’s best is orthodoxy among those who try to account for
wanting in terms of preference (e.g. Lewis (1986), Pettit (1991, 2002), Heim (1992),
Dreier (2005), Villalta (2008), Condoravdi and Lauer (2016), Rubinstein (2017)).
Most What’s-best Accounts on the market aren’t decision-theoretic—few decision-
theoretic accounts have been forwarded6—but we can translate them into our
decision-theoretic framework.
Consider a few What’s-best Accounts.7
S wants p iff S prefers p to not-p. (Davis, 1984)
[W]anting something is preferring it to certain relevant alternatives, the
relevant alternatives being those possibilities that the agent believes will
be realized if he does not get what he wants. (Stalnaker, 1984, p. 89)
5Buchak (2013) and Steele and Stefánsson (2016) review the literature.
6The decision-theroetic accounts I’m aware of are proposed by van Rooij (1999), Levinson (2003),
Wrenn (2010) (whose concern is all-things-considered desire) and Jerzak (2019).
7‘S’ ranges over the names of agents; ‘S’ ranges over the corresponding agents; ‘p’ ranges over
proposition-denoting strings; and (ignoring any context-dependence in p) ‘p’ ranges over the correspond-
ing propositions.
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pS wants pq is true at w iff p is true in all of the best worlds compati-
ble with S’s beliefs at w, as ranked by S’s preferences at w. (paraphras-
ing von Fintel (1999))
pS wants pq is true iff the expected value S at w assigns to p exceeds
the expected value S assigns to not-p. (van Rooij, 1999; Levinson, 2003)
(Most of these accounts presuppose that wanting is a propositional attitude, a
pedigreed, if contested (e.g. Montague (2007)), presupposition. To keep things
simple, I’ll take on this presupposition too.)
Here’s a view, within the expected value framework, that captures the basic idea
of the accounts just above.
Simple What’s-best Account
pS wants pq is true at w iff S at w assigns a higher expected value to p than
to any of certain alternatives.
(Levinson, for example, says that there’s just one certain alternative: not-p.8)
The Simple What’s-best Account is false. Its problem is shared by its more
sophisticated What’s-best Account brethren, decision-theoretic and otherwise: being
best is neither necessary nor sufficient for being wanted. Certain mundane facts
about wanting bring the problem into view.
Being best is not sufficient for being wanted because sometimes we want none
of the options we’re faced with, even the best one—a fact that has gone unac-
knowledged by advocates of What’s-best Accounts. Imagine that you have been
kidnapped and must make an awful choice: either shoot one of the two people
in front of you, or do nothing and both will be shot. Not being a sociopath, you
neither want to shoot, nor do you want to refrain from shooting and have the two
be shot! Although it’s not true that you want to shoot, shooting is nonetheless
best: you prefer shooting the one to not shooting the one and having both be shot.
Shooting is best, but you don’t want it.9 (Maybe you can be truly said to want to
8For Crnič (2011) and Phillips-Brown (2018), the certain alternatives are indexed to a partition on the
set of possible worlds, paralleling Lockean Theses—e.g. Locke’s (2014) and Leitgeb’s (2017)—on which
belief is partition-relative. (For a partition-relative view of belief outside of the Lockean literature, see e.g.
(Yalcin, 2016).)
9Advocates of What’s-best Accounts do have a possible reply. There are two parts to my claim that
being best is not sufficient for being wanted: first, that you do not want to shoot the one, and second,
that the alternative to shooting the one is not shooting and letting the two be killed, which makes shoot-
ing the one best. The reply would be to accept the first part but deny the second. In particular, to say
that not shooting and letting the two be killed is not the only alternative; rather, there’s some additional
alternative that you prefer to shooting the one, making shooting the one not best. If you like this reply,
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shoot, on which more in section 8. But you can also clearly be truly said not to:
that’s the problem for What’s-best Accounts.)
Or suppose that you are deeply, deeply depressed. There is nothing at all in the
whole world that you want. Life is misery. Even so, you do prefer some things to
others. Something is best, but nothing is wanted.
Being best is not necessary for being wanted because sometimes we want many
things, even if one of them isn’t best. Suppose that you’re going out to dinner.
Your options are the pizzeria, the ramen shop, and the hot dog stand, and while
hot dogs sound bad tonight, the other two options sound good. The pizzeria
would be best. You want to go the ramen shop, and you want to go to the pizzeria
even more. You want to go to the ramen shop, but you disprefer it to one of the
other alternatives. You want it, but it’s not best.
Proponents of What’s-best Accounts—in particular, Levinson (2003) and Crnič
(2011)—have claimed that cases like our pizza–ramen one are not in fact counterex-
amples to the thesis that being best is necessary for being wanted. They hypothesize
that ‘want’ is context-sensitive. We should represent agents with many value func-
tions, not just one, and which value function we use to evaluate a want ascription
differs by context. In each context, what’s wanted is what’s best according to the
value function in that context.
The different value functions are supposed to represent different dimensions
of value that matter to the agent. For example, one function will represent your
value of eating things that they are bready and cheesy, assigning higher values to
outcomes to the extent that she eats things that are bready and cheesy in them.
Relative to this function, pizza is best, while ramen is best according to a function
that favors eating brothy soups with noodles.
More formally, the idea is as follows. Where c is a context:
What’s-best Account with Varying Value Functions
pS wants pq is true in c at w iff S at w assigns a higher expected value to p
than to any of certain alternatives, relative to the value function in c.
Formally, this does save the thesis that being best is necessary for being wanted.
For example, we need both of the sentences on the following page to be true:
then the shooting case is not a counterexample. Nonetheless, What’s-good-enough Accounts are still
committed to something being wanted in all cases, since in all cases, something is best. We still have
counterexamples, then, in cases where nothing is wanted, like the depressive case just below.
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Pizza. You want to go to the pizzeria.
Ramen. You want to go to the ramen shop.
Both can be true if Pizza is evaluated in a context with a value function that rates
the pizzeria as best, and if Ramen is evaluated in a different context, one whose
value function ranks the ramen shop best.
The varying value functions don’t merely help formally in this case. What
they’re supposed to represent looks right too. The value function against which
Pizza comes out true represents your interest in things bready and cheesy, while Ra-
men comes out true against a value function that represents your interest in things
noodley and brothy. That feels right.
There are cases, though, where the account would have us posit multiple di-
mensions of value where there is only one. Imagine that you will be given a single
ticket from a hat. Most of the tickets are worthless. Two tickets, though, have cash
value, the red ticket (worth 50 dollars) and the blue ticket (worth 100 dollars). You
want to get the red ticket, and of course you also want to get the blue ticket. For-
mally, the two sentences would be true only if there are two contexts, each with
a different value function. Those value functions are supposed to represent differ-
ent dimensions of value. Along one dimension, the red ticket is better than the
blue ticket; along the other it’s flipped. But what would these different dimensions
of value be? The tickets are both good for the same thing: money. And as far as
money goes, 100 dollars is unambiguously better than 50; the blue ticket is unam-
biguously better than the red. The dimension on which the red ticket is valued
(money) is not one on which it’s best. The fact that you both want the red ticket
and want the blue ticket can’t be traced to multiple dimensions of value.
Let’s put What’s-best Accounts to rest.
4 A Simple What’s-good-enough Account
What’s-best Accounts are misguided. An alternative approach comes from what I
call What’s-good-enough Accounts, of which my own account is one. (Only three
other accounts that fall under the ‘What’s-good-enough Accounts’ umbrella have
been proposed—none are motivated in quite the way that I motivate mine. van
Rooij’s (1999) account I note just below; the others I discuss in footnote 15.)
What’s-good-enough Accounts claim that you want, well, what’s good enough
(in your eyes). This rights the wrongs of What’s-best Accounts. Recall that you
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want to go to the ramen shop and want to go to the pizzeria more. Why is it that
you can want two things (even though one of them isn’t best)? Intuitively, because
both are good enough. You’d be happy going to the pizzeria and happy going to
the ramen shop; either will do. Recall also that you want neither to shoot the one
nor refrain from shooting with the other two ending up shot. Why is it that you
can want neither of the two things (even though one of them is best)? Intuitively,
because neither is good enough. You don’t want to shoot the one or refrain from
shooting, because doing either would result in something truly awful.
A Simple What’s-good-enough Account is below. Something is good enough for
an agent when she assigns it an expected value that meets a certain threshold, a real
number.
Simple What’s-good-enough Account
pS wants pq is true at w iff the expected value S at w assigns to p meets a
certain threshold.
(van Rooij (1999) suggests that the threshold is the expected value that S at w as-
signs to a tautology.10) Compare the Simple What’s-good-enough Account to a
simple version of the Lockean Thesis: pS believes pq is true at w iff the credence S
at w assigns to p meets a certain threshold.
You want to go to the ramen shop and you want to go to the pizzeria. The
account can make sense of both facts by saying that the expected value you assign
to going to each place meets the threshold. You neither want to shoot the one
nor refrain from shooting, and the account can accommodate both of these facts,
too—this time by saying that neither option meets the threshold.
What’s-good-enough Accounts have another thing going for them: they neatly
explain the pervasive phenomenon of wanting p while simultaneously wanting not-
p (Baker (2010) calls these directly conflicting desires). Imagine that your daughter is
deciding whether to take over the family business. You both want her to take over
(it’s a generations-old tradition) and want her not to (it would be good for her to
find her own way in life). This has proved puzzling from a theoretical perspective
(e.g. Jackson (1985); Ashwell (2017)). Believing both that your daughter will take
over the business and that she won’t is paradigmatically irrational; more generally
it’s irrational to both believe p and believe not-p. But, intuitively, the same doesn’t
hold for wanting. Why should that be?
10For Pollock (2006), you want something iff it’s both best and good enough.
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On What’s-good-enough Accounts, cases of directly conflicting desires couldn’t
be simpler: both p and not-p can be good enough, and so both can be wanted.
Both your daughter taking over the business and her not doing so can be good
enough; both can be wanted.
The fact that What’s-good-enough Accounts neatly explain directly conflicting
desires undermines an objection that’s been made against the broader project of
accounting for wanting with preference. (Baker, 2010) is dedicated to establishing
that the project is doomed by directly conflicting desires. But his case rests on a
false presupposition: that preference-based accounts of wanting are What’s-best
Accounts. (His statement of preference-based accounts is: ‘that an agent wants p
reduces to preferring p to certain potential alternatives’ (p. 42).) He rightly argues
that What’s-best Accounts cannot account for directly conflicting desires. (A What’s-
best Account would say that if you want p and simultaneously want not-p, then
you prefer p to not-p and simultaneously prefer not-p to p, which is irrational.)
But of course we can adopt a What’s-good-enough Account instead, and if we do,
directly conflicting desires needn’t be problem.
What’s-good-enough Accounts are, I believe, the right kind of account. But the
Simple What’s-good-enough Account itself is wrong, as we’ll see in the next section.
5 Interlude: the context-sensitivity of what you’re truly said to want
We have to pause our discussion of just how wanting relates to decision theory.
To give any such account of this relation, or any account of wanting at all, we must
appreciate a certain fact: what you’re truly said to want isn’t intrinsic to you; it’s
partly determined by ascribers, and varies by context.
Add a further detail to our dinner case: I will be driving you to your dinner
destination. I’ll turn right for the pizzeria, left for the ramen shop. I ask where you
want to go. I can’t both turn left and right; we can’t go to both the pizzeria and
the ramen shop. Recall that you prefer the pizzeria to the ramen shop. Before, you
truly uttered Pizza and Ramen. But you must now commit. Make up your mind,
I’d say, which do you want? You must reply with what you prefer most, given
the choice between the three dinner options. What you prefer most, remember,
is the pizzeria, so Pizza is true. Because you disprefer the ramen shop, Ramen is
false in this new context. (Or, to bring out the point another way, imagine an on-
looker hearing you ask me to drive to the pizzeria. He could say, ‘I guess she [you]
ultimately does not want to go to the ramen shop’. In this context, Ramen is false.11)
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In the last section, there was a context where Ramen is true. But now we’ve
just seen a new context, a context with no change in your psychological state—no
change intrinsic to you—where Ramen is false. What you’re truly said to want is
not intrinsic to you; it’s context-sensitive.12
The context-sensitivity of what you’re truly said to want falsifies any account of
wanting, and I mean any account, decision-theoretic or otherwise, that ignores context
when giving necessary and sufficient conditions for wanting. Such accounts, the
Simple What’s-good-enough Account among them, simply say that you’re truly said
to want p just if some condition C obtains, where C is insensitive to context. To
take just some examples:
Simple What’s-best Account (repeated from above)
pS wants pq is true at w iff S at w assigns a higher expected value to p
than to any of certain alternatives.
Simple What’s-good-enough Account (repeated from above)
pS wants pq is true at w iff the expected value S at w assigns to p
meets a certain threshold.
S wants p iff S is disposed to take pleasure when it seems to her that p
obtains.13
S wants p iff S is disposed, other things equal, to do what she believes
will bring it about that p obtains.14
S has an ‘intrinsic appetitive desire that P’ iff S ‘constitute[s] P as a
reward’. (Arpaly and Schroeder, 2013, p. 128)
Read flatfootedly, the conditions C that these accounts place on wanting—the
right hand side of the biconditionals—don’t reference context. For example, the
account that concerns pleasure does not say pS wants pq is true in c iff S is dis-
posed to take pleasure when it seems to her that p obtains, given some constraint
imposed by c. Without mention of context, a contradiction follows. Given that
Ramen is true (in one context), the accounts say that C (taking pleasure in a certain
thing, being disposed to act in a certain way, etc.) obtains. But they also say that C
does not obtain, since Ramen is false (in another context).
12Others offer other data that suggest context-sensitivity: e.g. Villalta (2008), Lassiter (2011), and
Condoravdi and Lauer (2016).
13Morillo (1990) advances such a view.
14This is orthodoxy (Ashwell, 2017).
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I’m not claiming that there’s something faulty about these basic approaches
to wanting—in terms of pleasure, dispositions to act, etc.—but rather that their
instances here aren’t quite complete. It’s no great mystery how to fix them: the
condition C needs to be constrained by context, so that the same want ascription
can be true in one but false in another. Note, though, that this will change the
character of the accounts, each of which, as written, makes what you’re truly said
to want intrinsic to you: that you’re disposed to take pleasure in a certain thing,
that you’re disposed to act in a certain way, etc. Yet the constraints that context
places on the condition C are partly under the control of ascribers; they don’t
depend entirely on what’s going on inside of you. Adding these constraints makes
what you’re truly said to want not intrinsic to you.
It might strike you that there’s a simple fix to the problem of context-sensitivity
for want ascriptions. Many have hypothesized that ‘want’ has exactly two senses—in
other words, that ‘want’ is (two-way) ambiguous. For example, ‘want’ has been
thought to express either pro tanto or all-things-considered desire; a pro attitude
or a volitive attitude (Daveney, 1961); an appetitive attitude or a volitive attitude
(Davis, 1984). On such hypotheses, you’d expect that Ramen’s truth value would be
slippery. Ramen would be true with one sense and false with another.
Even if there are multiple senses of ‘want’, and I’ll suggest that there aren’t in
section 8, there can’t be exactly two. Add yet another detail to the case. You are
a gourmet, and the food options where you live aren’t up to your ideal. You say,
‘of course neither of these places do I want to go to. (They don’t hold a candle to
what’s in New York, for example. It’s just that in this culinary wasteland, they’re
the only places that pass for decent.)’ In this new context, both Pizza and Ramen
are false. We have three contexts on our hands: first the one where both Pizza and
Ramen are true; second the one where Pizza is true but Ramen is not; and now,
third, the one where both are false. Three contexts with shifting truth values are
one more than a hypothesis of exactly two senses can handle.
6 A context-sensitive What’s-good-enough Account
The goal is to give a decision-theoretic account of when you’re truly said to want,
and that, we now know, shifts by context.
I believe that what’s shifting by context is what counts as good enough. Or, for-
mally, what shifts is the threshold. A first pass implementation of this idea, to be
refined in the next section, is this:
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What’s-good-enough Account with Context-sensitive Threshold
pS wants pq is true in c at w iff the expected value S at w assigns to p meets
the threshold in c.15
Compare to a context-sensitive version of the Lockean Thesis: pS believes pq is
true in c at w iff the credence S at w assigns to p meets the threshold in c. (This
sort of context-sensitivity is more or less standard now among Lockeans about
belief; see e.g. Sturgeon (2008), Leitgeb (2017).) Further, note that on the What’s-
good-enough Account with Context-sensitive Threshold, ‘want’ is context-sensitive.
This aligns with a more general project according to which attitude verbs—among
them ‘believe’, ‘know’, ‘surprise’, and ‘suspect’—are context-sensitive.16
The What’s-good-enough Account with Context-sensitive Threshold inherits
the Simple What’s-good-enough Account’s merits, and as we’ll now see, corrects its
failure in cases of context-sensitivity.
Call to mind our three contexts: the one where Pizza and Ramen are both
true, the one where just Pizza is true, and the one where neither are. Formally, the
What’s-good-enough Account with Context-sensitive Threshold says that in the
context where both are true, the threshold is met both by the expected value that
you assign to the pizzeria and by the expected value that you assign to the ramen
shop. Where Pizza is true but Ramen is false, the threshold is higher, met by the
pizzeria but not the ramen shop. The threshold reaches even greater heights in the
context where both sentences are false. Neither the ramen shop nor the pizzeria
meet it. All of our cases are covered.17
15Bradley’s 1999 and Lassiter’s 2011 fall into this bucket. Bradley, who’s concerned with conditional
desire, says in passing, and without elaborating, ‘to desire that X is simply to desire Xmore than the
status quo or whatever other threshold is assumed in a particular context’ (p. 26).
For Lassiter, what’s good enough is what’s significantly greater than average. Average is represented by
Altc(p), a contextually determined set of propositions that includes p. (Lassiter’s view thus bears some
resemblance to the partition-relative views from footnote 8.) pS wants pq is true in c iff the expected
value S assigns to p is ‘significantly greater’ (p. 182) than the expected value S assigns to⋃Altc(p). Being
significantly greater than the average, though, is neither necessary nor sufficient for being wanted.
Not necessary.Assume that to the pizzeria you assign value 6; ramen shop, 2; hot dog stand, -2. There’s
an equal chance, suppose, that you’ll be taken to each:
⋃Altc(ramen shop)’s expected value is 2. You
want to go to the ramen shop, but the expected value you assign it (2) isn’t significantly greater than
average (also 2).
Not sufficient.Ani is vegetarian and dangerously allergic to shellfish. She’ll be served, with equal
likelihood, ratatouille (value 6), chicken (-30), or lobster (-900). The expected value she assigns to chicken
is thus -30. That’s significantly greater than average, -308, yet it’s false that Ani wants chicken.
16 On ‘believe’ outside of the Lockean literature see e.g. Stalnaker (2008). See e.g. Stine (1976) on
‘know’; Villalta (2008) on the analogues of ‘fear’, ‘hope’, and ‘glad’ in Spanish; Blumberg and Holguín
(2019) on ‘surprise’ and ‘suspect’.
17There’s a complication here, as an anonymous reviewer points out. Recall the case where I as your
driver ask where you want to go. Right for the pizzeria, left for the ramen shop. You say:
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Let’s explore more what it means for something to count as good enough, a
notion that we’ve so far been understanding on an intuitive level. What counts as
good enough, I believe, is determined by the communicative purposes of ascribers,
and what counts as good enough shifts by context because communicative purposes
shift by context. I will venture hypotheses about where the threshold is set in par-
ticular cases. These hypotheses are not supposed to be definitive, but rather make
up a sort of proof of concept of the idea that the threshold is fixed by communica-
tive purposes.
Start with the context where you say (repeating now from above), ‘Of course
neither of these places do I want to go to. (They don’t hold a candle to what’s in
New York, for example. It’s just that in this culinary wasteland, they’re the only
places that pass for decent.)’ Here, what counts as good enough is going to a
(i) a. I don’t really want [i.e. it’s not the case that I want] to go to the pizzeria,
b. but yeah, I want you to turn right here.
If (i) is evaluated in a single context, there’s potential trouble for theWhat’s-good-enough Account with
Varying Threshold—on which the conjuncts of (i) contradict each other in a single context. Yet some
hear (i) as true! (Why the contradiction? Imagine you assign the same expected value, V , to turning
right and to going to the pizzeria: the threshold in a single context is then simultaneously met by V (by
(i-b)) and not (by (i-a)).) In fact, everything’s copacetic; (i-a) and (i-b) are sometimes evaluated in dierent
contexts, or so I claim. While some hear (i) as true, others hear it as false, and when a sentence is heard as
true by some and false by others, a difference in context is often why. That’s prima facie reason to accept
my claim; I’ll now argue for it in detail.
Consider two sentences that share truth conditions with (i):
(ii) a. I don’t want to go to the pizzeria,
b. and I want you to turn right here.
(iii) a. I don’t really want to go to the pizzeria (it’s just not that good),
b. but the options in town being what they are, yeah, I want you to turn right here.
(ii) makes no sense, while (iii) sounds fine. Why the difference? In any such situation—two sentences
with the same truth conditions with different judgments—the usual suspect is context change, and it’s
indeed the culprit here. There’s context change within (iii) but not within (ii). The difference in con-
text change traces to a difference in howmuch material the sentences contain. (iii) is just (ii) with extra
material (and ‘but’ instead of ‘and’), which suggests a change in communicative purposes between its
conjuncts, and so a change in context. In (iii-a), ‘it’s just not that good’ suggests that the communicative
purpose of ‘I don’t really want to go to the pizzeria’ is to indicate displeasure at the quality of the pizzeria.
In (iii-b), ‘but the options in town being what they are’ suggests that the communicative purpose of‘I
want you to turn right here’ is to indicate to your driver that you most prefer turning right. (ii) has no
extra material; thus, no change between conjuncts in communicative purpose or context.
There’s a spectrum of judgments: (ii) makes sense to none, (i) to some but not all, (iii) to all. Corre-
spondingly, there’s a spectrum of material: (ii) the least, (i) is in the middle; (iii) the most. This match of
spectra is no accident. The extent that each (i)–(iii) make sense matches the extent that we perceive com-
municative purposes—and so contexts—as changing, and how we perceive communicative purposes is
driven by the extent of extra material. We’ve already seen how this works with (ii) and (iii). I hypothesize
that the reason that (i) makes sense to some, but not others, is that some, but not others, glean enough
from the extra material in (i) to tell a story about why communicative purposes would change between
the conjuncts of (i). (Certainly, this is true of me when I hear (i) as true.) Those who don’t hear (i) as true
don’t glean enough.
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restaurant that, to your mind, is of a certain quality—that of an average restau-
rant you like to go to in New York, say. Neither the pizzeria nor the ramen shop
compare favorably to that kind of restaurant, which is to say they don’t meet the
threshold. That’s why Pizza and Ramen are both false in this context.
A similar thing happens in the context where you can either shoot the one
or two will be shot. Plausibly, the reason that you speak truly in saying that you
neither want to shoot nor refrain from shooting is that you’re implicitly compar-
ing the choices available to you in this situation you’ve been forced into to the
choices that would be available if you weren’t under duress. (Imagine saying, ‘I
don’t want to shoot and I don’t want to not shoot and let the two be shot! But
I’m being forced to do one!’) When what counts as good enough are actions you’d
have available in a situation you would choose to be in, neither shooting nor not
shooting and letting the two be shot is good enough. Put differently, both shooting
and not look horrible in comparison to the kinds of actions you’d choose to have
available.18
Recall the thought that folk psychology serves to predict and explain our actions.
In communicating to your interlocutor that you prefer big city restaurants to the
ramen shop and the pizzeria, you give her information on which to predict your
future behavior: when given greater choices, you wouldn’t choose the ramen shop
or the pizzeria, even though in your current circumstance, you would. In commu-
nicating that you disprefer shooting to what you would do if you weren’t under
duress, you position your interlocutor to predict how you’d act if you weren’t un-
der duress.
Think now about the case where I am your driver and, asking you where you
want to go, will turn the car based on your answer. As we’ve said, what you’re
truly said to want here, among the dinner options, is only the one that you most
prefer. Part of our communicative purpose in this case is for you to instruct me
where to go; it would stand to reason that you should be instructing me to go only
where you most prefer to go, which is why what counts as good enough is only
what you most prefer.19
More generally, we have an insight into cases where what counts as good enough
is only what you most prefer, given certain options. Ascribing a desire to someone
18Daveney (1961) discusses how ‘want’ can communicate how one would choose to act when under
duress versus not.
19Things are more complicated when there’s a tie in what you most prefer. I’ll leave this issue for
another day.
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in such a context again gives the audience valuable information. Given that agents
tend to do what they most prefer to do—excepting cases of weakness of will or
irrationality—the audience can predict that the agent will try to do what’s she been
said to want to do in these contexts. And if the agent ends up acting in that way,
the audience can explain her action by pointing to the fact that what she did was
what she most preferred to do.
Finally, take the case where you truly say that you want to go to the pizzeria,
that you want to go to the ramen shop, and that you don’t want to go to the
hot dog stand. Suppose that when you assert all this, you and your conversational
partner are negotiating on where to go to dinner. I hypothesize that what counts as
good enough is anything Orange that’s preferable to cooking at home; or, perhaps,
what counts as good as enough is anything significantly preferable to cooking at
home—i.e. the threshold is set significantly higher than the expected value that you
assign to cooking at home. It’s helpful for the communicative purpose at hand for
the context to be set in this way. You are saying, more or less, that you’re willing
to go to dinner at either the ramen shop or the pizzeria, but unwilling to go to the
hot dog stand.
7 An upgraded context-sensitive What’s-good-enough Account
According to What’s-good-enough Accounts, you’re truly said to want what counts
as good enough, where what’s good enough is represented by a threshold. The
innovation from the last section is that this threshold varies by context. It turns
out—as we’ll see in this section—that the threshold varies not just by context, but
also by the world at which we evaluate a want ascription, the world of evaluation.
Put another way, the threshold is determined partly by the world of evaluation.
This fact falsifies the What’s-good-enough Account with Context-sensitive Thresh-
old (from the last section), which says that the threshold is determined only by the
context. We need to upgrade this account to one where the threshold is determined
by both context and the world of evaluation—the upgraded account is my view.20
To see that the threshold can vary with the world of evaluation, consider the
following case. Amelia is on a plane and wants to watch a movie, despite the fact
that the movie selection is what you’d usually find on a plane: not great. The best
movie on offer is Hotel Transylvania. Fix a context: one where you’re truly said to
20Thank you to one anonymous reviewer for raising the issue outlined in this paragraph (it prompted
me to write this section) and to another for helping me make my presentation clearer.
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want what’s best among your available options. Amelia’s traveling companion says:
(1) a. Amelia wants to watch Hotel Transylvania,
b. but of course she wouldn’t want to if Jaws were available.
To know how to evaluate (1-b), we need a semantics for counterfactual condi-
tionals on the table. For concreteness, take Stalnaker’s (1968): a counterfactual pif r,
qq is true in c at w iff q is true in the closest r-world to w. In other words, given a
context c, pif r, qq is true at a world of evaluation w iff its consequent, q, is true at
a different world of evaluation—namely, the closest r-world to w
(1) is true in the actual world, suppose. And so because (1-b) is actually true, it’s
not the case that Amelia wants to watch Hotel Transylvania at the closest world
to actuality where Jaws is available. But of course in the actual world, Amelia does
want to watch Hotel Transylvania, since (1-a) is actually true.
The situation, then, is this. Where w@ is the actual world and wJaws is the closest
world where Jaws is available: in a single context, it’s true in one world of evalua-
tion, w@, that Amelia wants to watch Hotel Transylvania, but not true at another
world of evaluation, wJaws. (And it’s at wJaws that we must evaluate the consequent
of (1-b).) Watching Hotel Transylvania is good enough at w@, but not at wJaws.
Why this difference between worlds? I hypothesize that it’s because there’s a
difference between worlds in what counts as good enough.21 We’re in a context
where what counts as good enough is the best of the available options, and the
best available option at w@ (Hotel Transylvania) differs from the best available op-
tion at wJaws (Jaws). What counts as good enough is, of course, represented by the
threshold. There’s a difference in threshold between worlds without any difference
in context: the threshold depends partly on the world of evaluation.
The world of evaluation plays a similar role in other cases, too. In the last sec-
tion, for instance, we considered a context where what counts as good enough
among the dinner options is anything that’s preferable to cooking at home or (per-
haps) anything significantly preferable to cooking at home. How good it is to have
dinner at home differs by world (in some worlds, you have filet mignon in the
fridge, in others, week-old leftovers), and in turn, what counts as good enough
differs by world—even though the context stays the same.
21Might the difference instead trace to a difference in the expected value Amelia assigns to seeing
Hotel Transylvania between worlds? It doesn’t; or anyway it needn’t. Imagine that in these two worlds,
Hotel Transylvania has the same cast, the same score, the same plot, the same everything. In both worlds,
Amelia assigns the same expected value to seeing it.
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A difference in threshold absent a difference in context falsifies the What’s-good-
enough Account with Context-sensitive Threshold, on which pS wants pq is true
in c at w iff the expected value S at w assigns to p meets the threshold in c. On this
account, the threshold is determined by context alone.
We need an upgraded account, one on which the context and the world of
evaluation together determine the threshold. How do they determine the threshold?
I believe that context plays a leading role. It tells us how to get from the world of
evaluation to the threshold. Take the context where what counts as good enough is
the best of the available options. Context says, give me a world w and I’ll tell you
the threshold to use when evaluating a want ascription at w: the threshold is the
expected value that you at w assign to the best of the available options at w.
Put formally, what I’m proposing is that context determines a function—a
threshold profile—from worlds to thresholds. Where tc is the threshold profile of
c, I submit:
What’s-good-enough Account with Context-sensitive Threshold Profile22
pS wants pq is true in c at w iff the expected value S at w assigns to p meets tc(w)
We have the familiar idea of the What’s-good-enough Account: you’re truly said
to want p just if the expected value you assign to p meets the threshold. What’s
new is that we’ve upgraded our theory on how the threshold is determined—it’s
determined by both the context and the world of evaluation.
The upgrade enables us to neatly get the right predictions in the movie case. In
that case, the context c is one where what counts as good enough (in a world) is
the best of the available options (in that world). The What’s-good-enough Account
22We actually need the threshold to also be (partly) determined by the agent. Consider why an agent-
independent threshold, like those in the main text, won’t do. It’s contested whether interpersonal
comparisons of utility are possible—i.e. whether we can sensibly compare the value functions of two
agents (Binmore (2009) reviews the literature). If we can’t, then we can’t sensibly compare the two
expected values that two agents assign to some proposition to a single number, or threshold: we need one
threshold for each agent. And even if we can, there’s still a problem. Take the context where one is truly
said to want the best of the available options: theWhat’s-good-enough Account with Context-sensitive
Threshold Profile says pS wants pq is true in c at w iff the expected value S at w assigns to pmeets tc(w)—
the expected value S at w assigns to the best of the available options. For another agent, S′, pS′ wants pq
is true in c at w iff the expected value S′ at w assigns to pmeets tc(w)—the expected value S′ at w assigns
to the best of the available options. But the two agents needn’t assign the same expected value to this
option! The threshold can’t be given by tc(w), but instead must be made relative to the agent.
I propose a function, t+c , from worlds and agents to thresholds. pS wants pq is true in c at w iff the
expected value S at w assigns to pmeets t+c (w, S). In a context where you want the best of the available
options, the threshold at w for pS wants pq, t+c (w, S), is the expected value S at w assigns to the best of
the available options, while for pS′ wants pq, the threshold at w, t+c (w, S′), is the expected value S′ at
w assigns to the best of the available options. (More rigorously, it’s the option that the agent finds best
among what she takes the available options to be.)
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with Context-sensitive Threshold Profile is fit to capture this fact. In evaluating a
want ascription at w@, the threshold tc(w@) equals the expected value Amelia at w@
assigns to watching the best available movie at w@, Hotel Transylvania. At wJaws, the
threshold is different—it’s tc(wJaws), the expected value Amelia at wJaws assigns to
watching the best available movie at wJaws, Jaws.
The upgrade is needed only when ‘want’ is embedded. Conditionals, like (1-b),
are one kind of embedding; attitude ascriptions, like ‘Otto thinks Esther wants to
get pizza’, are another. Only when there’s a difference in the world of evaluation
without a difference in context is there a difference between the predictions of the
What’s-good-enough Account with Context-sensitive Threshold Profile and the un-
upgraded What’s-good-enough Account with Context-sensitive Threshold. And this
occurs only when ‘want’ is embedded.
8 Onmultiple-senses hypotheses
I have attributed the context-sensitivity of want ascriptions to context-sensitivity
in ‘want’. As I mentioned in section 5, others attribute it to different senses of
‘want’—in other words, to ambiguity in ‘want’.
Such hypotheses are designed to make sense (with ambiguity) of certain pur-
ported phenomena involving want ascriptions—e.g. the purported phenomena
that whatever you intend to do, you can be truly said to want. As I’ll argue, my
account can make sense (without ambiguity) of these purported phenomena too.
Further, my account is neutral on whether the phenomena are genuine, a desirable
feature, since some have questioned the reality of these phenomena. I’ll illustrate all
of this with two commonly discussed senses of ‘want’: all-things-considered ‘want’
and volitive ‘want’.
(Multiple-senses hypotheses should give us pause. According to a widely ac-
cepted methodological principle, we should prefer hypotheses on which a term
is context-sensitive, like mine, to hypotheses on which it’s ambiguous.23 And,
as I showed in section 5, there aren’t exactly two senses of ‘want’, meaning that
multiple-senses hypotheses can’t be ones on which ‘want’ is two-way ambiguous,
like ‘bank’, but must be ones on which it is at least three-way ambiguous, an espe-
cially undesirable result.)
What you want, all things considered, is normally taken to be what you prefer
23Except in cases where languages lexicalize the term differently—e.g. how ‘bank’ can translate into
German as either ‘Bank’ or ‘Ufer’.
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most, given certain options. My account can make sense of such cases as follows.
When we’re in a context where what’s at issue is what you prefer among most
given certain alternatives, the threshold is set in a certain way. In particular, the
threshold is equal to the expected value that you assign to the most preferred op-
tion, which is therefore wanted since its expected value equals, and so meets, the
threshold. And none of the other options are wanted. Not being the most pre-
ferred option means a lower expected value than that of the most preferred, which
is to say lower than the threshold.
The kind of context that some would say contains the all-things-considered
‘want’, then, just comes out as a special case of a more general contextual variation in
‘want’. The threshold can be set in different places, and when it’s set in a certain
place—a place that, among the options you’re confronted with, is met only by the
most preferred option—it can match what others would say is a special sense of
‘want’.
Further, we can stay neutral on a contentious thesis that surrounds all-things-
considered wanting—the thesis that there’s always a context where you can truly be
said to want the most preferred of a given set of options, even when all of those
options are repellent to you. Take the case where you must either shoot the one
or let the two be killed. Is there a context where you’re truly said to want to shoot
the one, given that you most prefer it? The answer is yes according to the propo-
nent of the thesis; for the denier, the answer is no. In terms of the threshold, the
proponent will say that there’s a context where the threshold is met by shooting
the one; the denier will deny this.
More generally, the proponent will say that there is no floor on where the
threshold can be set: there is always a context where the threshold is set to the
expected value that you assign to the most preferred option, no matter how low
that value is. The denier thinks that there is a floor. Both the proponent and the
denier can accept my framework. And further, the framework gives us a clean way
to state the point of their contention—in terms of whether the threshold has a
floor.
Turn now to the controversial volitive sense of ‘want’.24 Volitive wanting is
supposed to go with intending. If you intend p, then you volitively want p. Put
without appealing to a special sense, the idea is that if you intend p, then there’s a
context where you’re truly said to want p. We can accommodate this idea too with
24Davis (1984) reviews the literature.
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context-sensitivity in ‘want’.25
In the terms of my view, the idea is that if you intend p, then there’s a context
where the expected value you assign to p meets the threshold—a context where
you’re truly said to want p. That idea and its denial are each compatible with my
view, which says nothing on where the threshold can be set. And again, my view
provides a clean framework to state the debate. This time the question is: does
intending p entail the existence of a context where the threshold is met by the
expected value you assign to p?
Similar things will go, I hope, for other multiple-senses hypotheses, like pro tanto
‘want’, or Daveney’s (1961) pro attitude ‘want’, or Davis’s (1984) appetitive ‘want’.
Supposing that our use of ‘want’ tracks such things as pro tanto wanting or pro
attitude wanting or appetitive wanting—whatever these amount to—they can be
accounted for with the threshold being set in some particular place. And if you’d
like to deny the existence of any of these purported phenomena that the senses
of ‘want’ are supposed to track, you can say that the threshold can’t be set in the
relevant ways.
9 Conclusions
If folk psychology and descriptive decision theory can’t be understood in terms
of one another, the dubious dualism looms: a competition between two greatly
significant representations of our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states—
two greatly significant systems of explanation and prediction of our actions.
To avoid the dubious dualism, I have taken up part of the project of accounting
for the concepts of folk psychology—in particular, wanting—with the concepts of
decision theory. I’ve maintained that you’re truly said to want what’s good enough
in your eyes—to want that to which you assign a certain expected value—and what
counts as good enough shifts by context.
This is just a first step. The next step, I believe, is investigating the logic of
wanting. The logic of belief has proven instrumental in the debates about Lock-
eanism, both between Lockeans and non-Lockeans and among Lockeans.26 I’ll close
by highlighting some issues in the logic of wanting to pursue further as we explore
whether we can account for wanting in the terms of decision theory—and if so, how.
25Levinson (2003) and Condoravdi and Lauer (2016) propose to do the same (within different
frameworks than mine).
26Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the importance of the logic of wanting here.
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Various debates about Lockeanism have been animated by whether belief is
closed under multi-premise entailment (see e.g. (Foley, 1992), (Hawthorne and
Bovens, 1999) and (Leitgeb, 2017, ch. 3)). Wanting, as my theory predicts, is not
closed under multi-premise entailment: ‘I want to clean with bleach’ (it’ll kill
germs) and ‘I want to clean with ammonia’ (it’ll remove grease) don’t entail ‘I
want to clean with bleach and ammonia’ (together, they produce deadly fumes).
It may well be, though, that some restricted form of multi-premise closure is valid.
Some think that a restricted form of single-premise closure is valid for wanting,27
even though unrestricted single-premise closure, which my theory doesn’t validate,
is not: ‘I want to die quickly’ doesn’t entail ‘I want to die’ (Anand and Hacquard, 2013).
Questions about the logic of ‘ought’ also give clues for what to pursue in the
logic of wanting. For example, Drucker (2017) points out that the Miner’s Puzzle
(see e.g. (Kolodny and MacFarlane, 2010)) has an analogue with ‘want’, and Jerzak
(2019) draws parallels between the so-called objective ‘ought’ and subjective ‘ought’,28
and Jerzak’s advisory ‘want’ and predictive ‘want’, respectively.
Finally, the problematic inference pattern identified by Villalta (2008, p. 478)
deserves our attention.29 Crnič (2011) gestures at one way to invalidate the pattern—
developed by Phillips-Brown (2018)30—and Rubinstein (2017) offers another. It
remains to be seen whether these ways of blocking the inference pattern work
within a decision-theoretic framework.
Even without having taken these next steps in the logic of wanting, our first
step has given us a lot to work with. Building on the general project of context-
sensitive understandings of attitude verbs, I’ve hypothesized a shifting bar for what
counts as good enough—shifting with both context and world—a bar that explains
why what you’re truly said to want is not intrinsic to you, why it varies by context
as the communicative purposes of ascribers vary by context. Further, we can, if
we want to, explain phenomena that have motivated traditional multiple-senses
hypotheses, without committing to an unsavory ambiguity.
27Crnič (2011) reviews the literature.
28See e.g. (Carr, 2015) on the subjective ‘ought’.
29The inference pattern is this: if pS wants pq is true and S is certain that p iff q, then pS wants qq is
true. (Villalta talks of belief, not certainty, but the point applies just as well to certainty.) Virtually every
semantics for ‘want’, including mine, incorrectly validates this inference.
30Phillips-Brown’s question-based semantics resembles Dandelet’s (ms) situation semantics.
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